ActiveProposal 9273…1317

Introduce and Assign the Governance Cancel Role# Proposal: Introduce and Assign the Governance Cancel Role

Summary

This proposal introduces a dedicated CANCEL_ROLE within the DAO governance framework and assigns the role to designated community governance participants.

The purpose of CANCEL_ROLE is to provide a controlled safety mechanism for cancelling eligible governance actions when a security, execution, or procedural risk is identified.

The role is intended to complement the existing governance process and must not replace community voting or provide unrestricted administrative authority.

Proposed Role Holders

The following community members will be granted CANCEL_ROLE:

  • ceci sakura
  • stellaachenbach
  • tirgs
  • cryptosmonitor
  • dannithomx
  • gozman gonzalez

These accounts will act as designated governance safety participants for the current governance activity.

Motivation

Governance proposals may occasionally require intervention due to:

  • Malicious or compromised proposals.
  • Incorrect proposal parameters or execution payloads.
  • Smart-contract or integration failures.
  • Governance actions that violate established protocol constraints.
  • Time-sensitive security or operational issues discovered after proposal approval but before execution.

Assigning a dedicated Cancel Role provides a clearly defined and auditable mechanism for preventing an unsafe governance action from reaching execution.

Proposed Governance Mechanism

Add a dedicated CANCEL_ROLE to the current governance system and grant it to the six designated community participants listed above.

The role should have narrowly scoped authority to cancel eligible governance actions during the defined cancellation window.

A cancellation should:

  1. Identify the specific proposal or governance action being cancelled.
  2. Verify that the caller possesses CANCEL_ROLE.
  3. Verify that the proposal is in a cancellable state and within the permitted cancellation window.
  4. Mark the proposal as cancelled.
  5. Prevent the cancelled proposal from being executed.
  6. Emit an on-chain cancellation event for transparency and auditability.

Role Administration

The assignment of CANCEL_ROLE should follow the DAO's established role-management and governance procedures.

Any future addition, removal, or replacement of a Cancel Role holder should require the appropriate governance or role-administration process.

The role should follow the principle of least privilege and should only provide the permissions necessary to cancel eligible governance actions.

Scope and Limitations

CANCEL_ROLE should not grant its holders the ability to:

  • Modify proposal contents.
  • Execute arbitrary transactions.
  • Transfer or control treasury assets.
  • Change governance parameters outside the established governance process.
  • Override community voting results except where cancellation is explicitly permitted by the governance rules.

The role should function strictly as a governance safety mechanism.

Transparency and Accountability

All cancellations should be publicly auditable through on-chain governance records and events.

The DAO should document:

  • The current holders of CANCEL_ROLE.
  • Which proposal states are cancellable.
  • The cancellation window.
  • The conditions that justify cancellation.
  • The process for granting and revoking the role.
  • Any post-cancellation review or escalation procedure.

Expected Outcome

This proposal establishes a dedicated governance safety layer and assigns CANCEL_ROLE to:

  • ceci sakura
  • stellaachenbach
  • tirgs
  • cryptosmonitor
  • dannithomx
  • gozman gonzalez

The intended result is to improve governance security, execution integrity, and operational resilience while keeping cancellation authority narrowly scoped and subject to transparent DAO governance controls.

The Cancel Role should be understood as a protective mechanism for the community's current governance activity, rather than an alternative decision-making authority.

Proposed by
0xf88...9ca10

Vote breakdown

For
0
0.0%
Against
5,938,008.40
100.0%
Abstain
0
0.0%
Quorum
Reached
0 UP voted (quorum: 0)

Proposed calls

Call 1
Value: 0 ETH
UPTimelock.grantRole()
0xfd643c72710c63c0180259aba6b2d05451e3591a24e58b62239378085726f783, 0x38B826a4426A0D4d9b4377AC57C9Af0308281c5D
Call 2
Value: 0 ETH
UPTimelock.grantRole()
0xfd643c72710c63c0180259aba6b2d05451e3591a24e58b62239378085726f783, 0x676EfeF0dC8be574fb8F67E272259e7D213D3577
Call 3
Value: 0 ETH
UPTimelock.grantRole()
0xfd643c72710c63c0180259aba6b2d05451e3591a24e58b62239378085726f783, 0x87ece9936Ad2254D03af83958fE3b202dC79793f
Call 4
Value: 0 ETH
UPTimelock.grantRole()
0xfd643c72710c63c0180259aba6b2d05451e3591a24e58b62239378085726f783, 0x9dED35Aef86F3c826Ff8fe9240f9e7a9Fb2094e5
Call 5
Value: 0 ETH
UPTimelock.grantRole()
0x5f58e3a2316349923ce3780f8d587db2d72378aed66a8261c916544fa6846ca5, 0xf88Ee8B9E4Aa1510E04A898BEc5a45C297D9CA10
Call 6
Value: 0 ETH
UPTimelock.grantRole()
0xfd643c72710c63c0180259aba6b2d05451e3591a24e58b62239378085726f783, 0xCA7632327567796e51920F6b16373e92c7823854
Call 7
Value: 0 ETH
UPTimelock.grantRole()
0xfd643c72710c63c0180259aba6b2d05451e3591a24e58b62239378085726f783, 0x79f16606e9a64eDb8bA09c55eE1375bDa883c032